

DANIELLE BROMWICH

Department of Bioethics
Clinical Center
National Institutes of Health
10 Centre Drive, Bldg. 10, Rm. 1C118
Bethesda, MD 20892-1156
Phone: 301-451-6751
bromwichd@cc.nih.gov

CURRENT POSITION:

2008-2010: Post-doctoral Fellow, Department of Bioethics, Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health

EDUCATION:

2002-2008: Ph.D. Philosophy
University of Toronto
Dissertation: **Belief Internalism**
Supervisor: Sergio Tenenbaum
Readers: Philip Clark, Thomas Hurka and Cheryl Misak

2001-2002: MA. Philosophy (Distinction)
University of Sheffield (UK)
Dissertation: **C. S. Peirce on Instincts and Commonsense: The Importance of Self Control**
Supervisor: Christopher Hookway

1998-2001: BA. Philosophy (First class honours)
University of Sheffield (UK)

AREA OF SPECIALISATION:

Metaethics, Bioethics

AREAS OF COMPETENCE:

Moral Philosophy, American Pragmatism (especially C. S. Peirce) and Political Philosophy

PAPERS ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION:

- Forthcoming: "Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism" *Philosophical Studies*
- Forthcoming: "How Not to Argue for Internalism" in Thom Brooks (ed) *New Waves in Ethics* (Palgrave Macmillan)

PAPERS ACCEPTED FOR PRESENTATION:

I. Peer-reviewed

- 2009: "A Problem for Motivational Externalism"
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Main Program (Vancouver, Canada)
- 2008: "Belief and Motivation"
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Main Program (Pasadena, California, USA)
- 2008: "Belief, Desire and Motivation"
Society for Philosophy and the Contemporary World
American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Group Program (Chicago, Illinois, USA)
- 2007: "A Dilemma and a Solution for Korsgaard"
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Main Program (Baltimore, Maryland, USA)
- 2007: "A Dispositional Anti-Humean Response to the Moral Problem"
Canadian Philosophical Association (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada)
- 2006: "Internalism, Normativity, Blame and Character"
Canadian Philosophical Association (York, Ontario, Canada)
- 2005: "Implications of the Dispositional Account of Belief for the Humean Theory of Motivation"
Canadian Philosophical Association (London, Ontario, Canada)
- 2005: "Implications of the Dispositional Account of Belief for the Humean Theory of Motivation"

32nd Value Inquiry Conference on Reason and Evaluation
(Louisiana State University, Louisiana, USA)

2005: "A Dilemma for Korsgaard: The Internalism Requirement
or the Universal Normativity of Moral Reasons?"
10th International Kant Congress (University of Sao Paulo,
Sao Paulo, Brazil)

2004: "More Reason to be Sceptical about Practical Reason"
Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: a special conference on
values (University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point, Stevens
Point, Wisconsin, USA)

II. Invited

2009: "Ethical Conduct for Studies in Vulnerable Populations"
International Symposium on Rheumatic Diseases in Indigenous
North American Populations (INA) ...from Molecules to
Communities (University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba,
Canada)

ACADEMIC AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

I. Fellowships and Grants

2008-2010: Post-doctoral Fellowship, Clinical Center, National
Institutes of Health
2007-2008: Centre for Ethics Doctoral Fellowship
2006-2007: School of Graduate Studies Post-Doc Fellowship
Awarded, but not taken up.
2004-2008: Ian Hacking Graduate Fellowship
2003-2004: Gordon Cheesborough Graduate Fellowship
2002-2006: University of Toronto Fellowship
2001-2002: Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB) Grant

II. Awards, Prizes and Stipends

2008: APA Pacific Division Graduate Stipend
2007: APA Eastern Division Graduate Stipend
2005-2008: Margaret Ronald Taylor and Thomas Paxton Taylor Award
2004-2005: Martha Lile Love Teaching Award
2008-2008: George Paxton Young Memorial Prize

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

I. Instructorships

- 2006: PHL 495F Meta-ethics: The Moral Problem
Nominated for the Martha Lile Love Teaching Prize
- 2006: PHL 365F Contemporary Political Philosophy
Nominated for the Martha Lile Love Teaching Prize
- 2004: PHL 333F Issues in Epistemology: Peirce's Pragmatism
Awarded the Martha Lile Love Teaching Prize

II. Teaching Assistantships

Tutorial Leader

- 2007: PHL B09F Bio-medical Ethics
- 2006: PHL 275F Introduction to Ethics
- 2005: PHL 265S Introduction to Political Philosophy
- 2003-2004: PHL 100Y Introduction to Philosophy

Essay Clinician 2006, 2007, 2008

Grader

- 2005: PHL232S Epistemology and Metaphysics
- 2004: PHL282S Ethics: Death and Dying
- 2003: PHL 232S Introduction to Epistemology
- 2003-2004: PHL 281Y Bioethics

SERVICE:

I. Clinical

- 2009-2010: Fellow on call, Ethics Consultation Service, Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health
- 2009-2010: Member, Capacity Assessment Tools Development Team, Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health
- 2009-2010: Interviewer, "Parental Permission and Adolescent Assent and Decision Making in Clinical Research" study, Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health
- 2008-2009: Observer, NIAID and NIMH Clinical Rounds, Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health

2008-2009 Observer, CNS White Panel IRB, Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health

II. Research

2006: Research Assistant for Sergio Tenenbaum on *Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason*

2005-2006: Research Assistant for Cheryl Misak on *The New Pragmatists*

2005: Research Assistant for Thomas Hurka on 'Virtuous act, Virtuous disposition'

2002-2004: Research Assistant for Cheryl Misak on *The Cambridge Companion to Peirce*

2002-2004: Research Assistant for Cheryl Misak on *Truth and the End of Inquiry*

III. Administrative

2007-2008: Organising Conference Committee Member, *Desire, Practical Reason and the Good: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Center of Ethics, Toronto, Canada)

2005-2006: Colloquium Committee Member

2005-2006: Organising Committee Member, sixth annual University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Philosophy

2004-2006: Graduate Philosophy Student Union Secretary

2004-2006: Graduate Executive Committee member

2004-2006: Reviewer for the fourth, fifth and sixth annual University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Philosophy

2003-2004: Graduate Student Union (GSU) Representative

REFEREES:

1. Sergio Tenenbaum, University of Toronto (sergio.tenenbaum@utoronto.ca)
2. Thomas Hurka, University of Toronto (tom.hurka@utoronto.ca)
3. Cheryl Misak, University of Toronto (cheryl.misak@utoronto.ca)
4. David Wendler, National Institutes of Health (dwendler@nih.gov)

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

In my dissertation I defend a version of cognitivist motivational internalism which I call **Belief Internalism**. The constitutive claim of any version of cognitivist motivational internalism is that if one believes 'It is right that I ϕ ', then one will be motivated to ϕ . This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with the dominantly held Humean theory of motivation. The constitutive claim of the Humean thesis is that no belief could entail motivation without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. So, while the cognitivist motivational internalist tells us that there is a conceptual connection between moral belief and motivation, the Humean tells us that there could be no such connection.

In defence of cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to argue either that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate *ceteris paribus*. But, while succumbing to the first temptation places one under an ultimately insurmountable burden to justify the motivational exceptionality of moral beliefs, succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practical nature of morality. I avoid both of these problems by defending a more radical departure from the Humean theory of motivation.

I start by arguing for a motivationally efficacious conception of belief. First, I demonstrate that it is conceptually coherent for belief to entail motivation. I then argue that all beliefs have behavioural dispositional properties that are not predicated on a conceptually independent desire; in particular, all beliefs can motivate assent without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. I then develop a unified and inclusive account of cognitive motivation according to which unqualified normative cognition—which includes moral cognition—motivates normative actions without the assistance of such a desire. Beliefs of the form 'I ought to ϕ ' or 'It is right that I ϕ ', in other words, motivate the believer to ϕ .

CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS

I am currently working on projects in research ethics and metaethics.

RESEARCH ETHICS:

The first project is in research ethics, an area of applied philosophy concerned with the ethics of conducting medical research on human participants. Medical research is not primarily designed to benefit the individual studied but is, rather, designed to benefit society by answering scientific questions that will hopefully lead to new or improved health interventions. But what makes it permissible, and when it is permissible, to subject one individual to risks, pain and inconvenience for the sake of others? One answer is the individual's informed consent. But, while many accept that valid informed consent is necessary for most ethical medical research and that medical research participants must understand the information that is standardly disclosed to them in order to give valid consent to research participation, we have very reliable data that show that many competent individuals simply do not understand the information standardly disclosed. And, if this right, then much medical research, which seems ethical, is in fact unethical.

An interesting way to avoid this unpalatable conclusion is championed by Gopal Sreenivasan. It involves giving up the idea that medical research participants need to understand the information standardly disclosed to them. Sreenivasan argues that not only is comprehension of standard disclosure unnecessary for valid informed consent, but the expected cost of both holding and enforcing a comprehension requirement is not a price worth paying all things considered.

In "Comprehending the Comprehension Requirement" I argue that neither holding nor enforcing the comprehension requirement is morally problematic all things considered. I argue that research ethicists need to address: (i) what information needs to be understood in order for consent to research participation to be valid and (ii) what the researcher has to do in order to properly discharge the duty to obtain valid consent to research participation. I am now working on a paper that cashes out the content of the comprehension requirement. And, presently, I will be working on a paper that outlines reasonable steps to achieve comprehension which will allow researchers to properly discharge their duty to obtain valid informed consent to research participation.

UNDER REVIEW

- "Comprehending the Comprehension Requirement"

IN PREPARATION

- "The Content of the Comprehension Requirement" (with Joseph Millum)

METAETHICS

The second project is in metaethics. Motivational Externalists—proponents of the thesis that moral judgements are motivationally inert—have claimed a modest victory in recent years. They claim to have shown that the burden of proof lies firmly on their opponent’s—the Motivational Internalist’s—shoulders. Externalists cite everyday examples of amorality and apathy either to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to sincerely judge that ‘It is right that I ϕ ’ and yet not be motivated to ϕ or to demonstrate that the burden of proof lies with the internalist. My overall goal is to show that externalists have been too hasty in claiming even this modest victory.

In “Back to Stalemate: The Motivational Internalism/Externalism Debate” (under review), I acknowledge that internalists have responded to externalist’s challenges rather poorly either by attempting to diagnose the failure of the amoral or the apathetic agent or by embracing a weakened defence of the internalist thesis. I argue that by critically examining the assumptions that underlie the externalist’s challenges we see that these purported counterexamples not only fail to disprove internalism but also fail to shift the burden of proof.

I am currently working on two further papers on this topic. In the first, I argue that all forms of motivational externalism are predicated on the assumption that reliably determining the extension of a moral concept is sufficient for fully understanding that concept. I plan to show that we have no good reason to accept this assumption. In the second, I assess the scientifically informed purported counterexamples to motivational internalism—cases of psychopathy, ventromedial prefrontal cortex deficits, and clinical depression—and argue that the data on these conditions are actually friendlier to internalism than externalism.

UNDER REVIEW

- “Back to Stalemate: The Motivational Internalism/Externalism Debate”

IN PREPARATION

- “The Problem with Motivational Externalism”
- “Problems with Scientifically Informed Challenges to Motivational Internalism”