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## BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS:

Date of Birth: 1<sup>st</sup> October 1978  
Nationality: British

## CURRENT POSITION:

2008-2010: Post-doctoral Fellow, Department of Bioethics, NIH

## EDUCATION:

2002-2008: Ph.D. Philosophy  
University of Toronto  
Dissertation: **Belief Internalism**  
Supervisor: Sergio Tenenbaum  
Readers: Philip Clark, Thomas Hurka and Cheryl Misak

2001-2002: MA. Philosophy (Distinction)  
University of Sheffield (UK)  
Dissertation: **C. S. Peirce on Instincts and Commonsense: The  
Importance of Self Control**  
Supervisor: Christopher Hookway

1998-2001: BA. Philosophy (First class honours)  
University of Sheffield (UK)

## AREA OF SPECIALISATION:

Metaethics

## AREAS OF COMPETENCE:

Bioethics, American Pragmatism (especially C. S. Peirce),  
Political Philosophy and Epistemology

## PAPERS:

Forthcoming: 'Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism' accepted at **Philosophical Studies**

## PRESENTATIONS:

- 2008: 'A Problem for Motivational Externalism'  
**American Philosophical Association, Main Program**  
(Vancouver, Canada)
- 2008: 'Belief and Motivation'  
**American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Main Program** (Pasadena, California, USA)
- 2008: 'Belief, Desire and Motivation'  
**Society for Philosophy and the Contemporary World**  
**American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Group Program** (Chicago, Illinois, USA)
- 2007: 'A Dilemma and a Solution for Korsgaard'  
**American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Main Program** (Baltimore, Maryland, USA)
- 2007: 'A Dispositional Anti-Humean Response to the Moral Problem'  
**Canadian Philosophical Association** (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada)
- 2006: 'Internalism, Normativity, Blame and Character'  
**Canadian Philosophical Association** (York, Ontario, Canada)
- 2005: 'Implications of the Dispositional Account of Belief for the Humean Theory of Motivation'  
**Canadian Philosophical Association** (London, Ontario, Canada)
- 2005: 'Implications of the Dispositional Account of Belief for the Humean Theory of Motivation'  
**32nd Value Inquiry Conference on Reason and Evaluation**  
(Louisiana State University, Louisiana, USA)

- 2005: 'A Dilemma for Korsgaard: The Internalism Requirement or the Universal Normativity of Moral Reasons?'  
10th International Kant Congress (University of Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil)
- 2004: 'More Reason to be Sceptical about Practical Reason' Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: a special conference on values (University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point, Stevens Point, Wisconsin, USA)

## ACADEMIC AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

### I. Fellowships and Grants

- 2007-2008: Centre for Ethics Doctoral Fellowship  
2006-2007: School of Graduate Studies Post-Doc Fellowship  
2004-2008: Ian Hacking Graduate Fellowship  
2003-2004: Gordon Cheesborough Graduate Fellowship  
2002-2006: University of Toronto Fellowship  
2001-2002: Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB) Grant

### II. Awards, Prizes and Stipends

- 2008: APA Pacific Division Graduate Stipend  
2007: APA Eastern Division Graduate Stipend  
2005-2008: Margaret Ronald Taylor and Thomas Paxton Taylor Award  
2004-2005: Martha Lile Love Teaching Award  
2008-2008: George Paxton Young Memorial Prize

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

### I. Instructorships

- 2006: PHL 495F Meta-ethics: The Moral Problem  
Nominated for the Martha Lile Love Teaching Prize
- 2006: PHL 365F Contemporary Political Philosophy  
Nominated for the Martha Lile Love Teaching Prize
- 2004: PHL 333F Issues in Epistemology: Peirce's Pragmatism  
Awarded the Martha Lile Love Teaching Prize

## II. Teaching Assistantships

### Tutorial Leader

2007:	PHL B09F Bio-medical Ethics
2006:	PHL 275F Introduction to Ethics
2005:	PHL 265S Introduction to Political Philosophy
2003-2004:	PHL 100Y Introduction to Philosophy

Essay Clinician 2006, 2007, 2008

### Grader

2005:	PHL232S Epistemology and Metaphysics
2004:	PHL282S Ethics: Death and Dying
2003:	PHL 232S Introduction to Epistemology
2003-2004:	PHL 281Y Bioethics

## SERVICE:

### I. Departmental

2006-2007:	Organising Conference Committee Member, <i>Desire, Practical Reason and the Good: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives</i>
2005-2006:	Colloquium Committee Member
2005-2006:	Organising Committee Member, sixth annual University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Philosophy
2004-2006:	Graduate Philosophy Student Union Secretary
2004-2006:	Graduate Executive Committee member
2004-2006:	Reviewer for the fourth, fifth and sixth annual University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Philosophy
2003-2004:	Graduate Student Union (GSU) Representative

### II. Non-Departmental

2006:	Research Assistant for Sergio Tenenbaum on <i>Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason</i>
2005-2006:	Research Assistant for Cheryl Misak on <i>The New Pragmatists</i>

2005: Research Assistant for Thomas Hurka on 'Virtuous act, Virtuous disposition'

2002-2004: Research Assistant for Cheryl Misak on *The Cambridge Companion to Peirce*

2002-2004: Research Assistant for Cheryl Misak on *Truth and the End of Inquiry*

2002: Editorial Board Member *Review Journal of Political Philosophy* Vol. 1, 2003

**REFEREES:**

1. Prof. Sergio Tenenbaum, University of Toronto  
sergio.tenenbaum@utoronto.ca (416-978-0919)
2. Prof. Thomas Hurka, University of Toronto  
tom.hurka@utoronto.ca (416-978-20560)
3. Prof. Cheryl Misak, University of Toronto  
cheryl.misak@utoronto.ca (416-978-2998)

## DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

### Belief Internalism

In my dissertation I defend a version of cognitivist motivational internalism which I call **Belief Internalism**. The constitutive claim of any version of cognitivist motivational internalism is that moral belief entails motivation. So, if one believes that 'It is right that I  $\phi$ ', then one will be motivated to  $\phi$ . Many philosophers think that cognitivist motivational internalism is an important thesis in ethics because it alone captures the practical nature of morality. However, this internalist thesis is in tension with the dominantly held Humean theory of motivation. The constitutive claim of the Humean thesis is that no belief could entail motivation. So, while the internalist tells us that there is a conceptual connection between moral belief and motivation, the Humean tells us that there could be no such connection.

In defence of cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to argue either that the Humean constraint only applies to **non-moral** beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate *ceteris paribus*. But, while succumbing to the first temptation places one under an ultimately insurmountable burden to justify the motivational exceptionality of moral beliefs, succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practical nature of morality. I avoid the temptation to defend this thesis in either of these flawed ways by defending a more radical departure from the Humean theory of motivation.

I avoid the first temptation by arguing for a motivationally efficacious conception of belief. I start the defence by demonstrating that it is conceptually coherent for belief to entail motivation. I then argue that all beliefs have behavioural dispositional properties that are not predicated on desire; in particular, all beliefs can motivate assent without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. I then develop a unified and inclusive account of cognitive motivation according to which unqualified normative cognition—which includes moral cognition—motivates normative actions without the assistance of such a desire. Beliefs of the form 'I ought to  $\phi$ ' or 'It is right that I  $\phi$ ', in other words, motivate the believer to  $\phi$ .

I avoid the second temptation by arguing that moral belief motivates *simpliciter* as opposed to *ceteris paribus*. There are, however, both commonsense and scientifically informed counterexamples which *prima facie* demonstrate that it is possible to both fully believe and fully understand one's first person cognitive moral judgement and yet not be motivated by that judgement. Psychologically real examples of psychopaths, addicts, depressed persons and so on are *prima facie* problematic for internalism. Subjects, suffering from these kinds of ailments, appear capable of understanding the contents of their beliefs and yet capable of not being motivated by these beliefs. I argue that the commonsense *prima facie* counterexamples are not decisive; and I argue that the scientifically informed *prima facie* counterexamples misinterpret the empirical research on salient psychological conditions.